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Abstract
We derive closed-form solutions for the Rubinstein alternating of-
fers game for cases where the two players have (possibly asymmetric)
utility functions that belong to the HARA class and discount the fu-
ture at a constant rate. We show that risk aversion may increase a
bargainers payoﬀ. This result - which contradicts Roth’s 1985 theo-
rem tying greater risk neutrality to a smaller payoﬀ - does not rely on
imperfect information or departures from expected utility maximiza-
tion.
∗Department of Economics, University of Warwick, CV4 7AL Coventry, U.K. E-mail :
e.kohlscheen@warwick.ac.uk.
†Department of Economics, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA 19081. E-mail :
steve_oconnell@swarthmore.edu.
‡We thank Ken Binmore, Bhaskar Dutta and Dezsoe Szalay for useful comments and
suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
1
1 Introduction
In the celebrated Rubinstein (1982) bargaining game, the parties to a bilat-
eral negotiation make alternating oﬀers on how to split an economic surplus
(normalized here to size 1). The players discount the future and are there-
fore impatient to conclude the negotiation. In the case of linear utility and
constant discount rates, the game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium
(SPE) in which agreement is immediate and the parties receive
eq = δ + δeδh
δ + eδ + δeδh and q = eδδ + eδ + δeδh, (1)
respectively, where eδ ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1) are the discount rates of player
1 and player 2 and h is the length of the interval between oﬀers (player 1
makes the first oﬀer and is denoted throughout by ~). The game confers a
‘first-mover’ advantage on player 1, but this artefact disappears as the time
interval between oﬀers shrinks to zero. In the limit, payoﬀs depend only on
the relative impatience of the players:
eq = δ
δ + eδ and q = eδδ + eδ . (2)
When discount rates are equal, the alternating oﬀers game generates the
familiar Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) of a 50-50 split. For arbitrary
discount rates ∈ [0, 1], Binmore (1987a) showed that the Rubinstein equilib-
rium corresponds to a generalized NBS in which the bargaining powers of
the players are inversely related to their discount rates.
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Rubinstein’s analysis has proven its worth not only in the game theory
literature but also in applied theory and empirical work (e.g., Shaked and
Sutton 1984, Bulow and Rogoﬀ 1989, Muthoo 1996 and Binmore 2007a).
In an applied context, however, the assumption of linear utility is restric-
tive, and particularly so if the possibility of delay is viewed as central to
how players behave. Broad categories of microeconomic behaviour under
uncertainty — including applications that might well incorporate aspects of
bilateral monopoly — cannot be understood without appeal to some form of
risk aversion. At the same time, a great deal of empirical evidence in macro-
economics and modern consumption theory in particular suggests positive
risk aversions.
Theorists have long since moved beyond linearity in studying the alter-
nating oﬀers game (Binmore, Osborne and Rubinstein 1992 survey early
contributions). Our interest, however, is more specific: what is the impact of
concavity on bargaining payoﬀs? Roth (1985 and 1989) studies this question
in the alternating oﬀers game and finds that greater risk aversion decreases
a bargainers’ share. 1 To our knowledge, departures from Roth’s finding
have relied either on the inclusion of lotteries in the set of possible outcomes
(Roth and Rothblum 1982), on imperfect information (Osborne 1984), or
on departures from the expected utility maximization paradigm (Volij and
Winter 2002).
1As he notes, risk aversion in a non-stochastic environment refers purely to strategic
risk - the risk that agreement is delayed - rather than probabilistic risk.
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From an applied perspective, the impact of Roth’s result has been limited
by the absence of closed-form solutions for the risk-averse case. We show in
this paper, however, that the linear case is nested within a broader class
of cases incorporating alternative and possibly asymmetric degrees of risk
aversion. We derive closed form solutions for the alternating oﬀers game
for cases in which the two players have utility functions that belong to the
hyperbolic absolute risk aversion class (HARA) and have constant discount
rates.
The analysis that is closest to ours is that of Binmore (2007b), who derives
a closed-form solution to the alternating oﬀers game when the players have
iso-elastic utility functions u(z) = zσ for 0 < σ < 1. Our approach diﬀers
from Binmore’s, however, in some important respects. First, we solve the
alternating oﬀers game for the entire class of HARA utility functions. Second,
in direct contrast to Roth (1985) and the subsequent literature (e.g. Binmore
(2007b)), we find that the impact of risk aversion on payoﬀs can be positive.
We illustrate this with a case in which one player displays decreasing absolute
risk aversion (DARA). Contrary to previous studies, this contradiction of
Roth does not rely on imperfect information or on departures from expected
utility maximization. Third, Binmore’s analysis is restricted to situations in
which both players display risk aversions below one. The bulk of empirical
evidence, however, places the degree of relative risk aversion above unity.
Our analysis of DARA utility functions covers a much broader spectrum of
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risk aversions.
2 Preliminaries: linear utility
Consider the alternating oﬀers game over a division of a pie of size one
(Rubinstein 1982).
For the game starting at time t, the minimal initial oﬀer by player 1 in
any SPE, q[1]t , must leave player 2 indiﬀerent between accepting that amount
and rejecting it in order to make its own best counter-oﬀer in the following
period. Hence
u(q[1]t ) = β(h)u(q
[2]
t+h), (3)
where h is the (exogenous) time interval between oﬀers, β(h) = (1+ δh)−1 is
the discount factor player 2 applies to future utility, and q[2]t+h is the largest
share player 2 can hope to retain when it makes its counter-oﬀer. By the
same argument, q[2]t+h must leave player 1 indiﬀerent between accepting and
rejecting. Hence
eu(1− q[2]t+h) = eβ(h)eu(1− q[1]t+2h) (4)
where ~ refers to player 1.
When utility functions are linear, equations (3) and (4) yield the diﬀerence
equation
q[1]t = β[1− eβ(1− q[1]t+2h)], (5)
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with stationary solution
qS(h) =
β(1− eβ)
1− βeβ (6)
or, equivalently, (1). When both players discount the future the transversality
condition
lim
τ→∞
(βeβ)τ/2hq[1]t+τ = 0 (7)
holds for any h > 0 and establishes q[1]t = qS as the unique solution to (5).
A straightforward argument then establishes that (6) also characterizes
player 1’s maximal equilibrium oﬀer (Shaked and Sutton 1984, Rubinstein
1987, Binmore 1987b). Equilibrium is therefore unique. The players employ
stationary strategies, with player 1 oﬀering qS whenever it has the oﬀer,
always accepting anything at least as good as 1 − qS, and always rejecting
anything worse than 1 − qS (player 2 does the reverse). Implementation is
immediate: player 2 accepts player 1’s first oﬀer. Equation (6) approaches
equation (2) as the time period between oﬀers goes to zero.
3 The Rubinstein game with utility functions
of the HARA class
We show in this section that linear utility is nested within a much broader
class that generates closed-form solutions to the Rubinstein game. To see
this, note that in the general case equations (3) and (4) imply the recursion
q[1]t = u
−1[βu{1− eu−1(eβeu(1− q[1]t+2h))}]. (8)
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The properties of (8) are governed by those of the composite function
g(x) = u−1(mu(x − n)), for constants m and n. This function is linear in
x for any member of the widely-used HARA class of utility functions first
described by Merton 1971:
u(x) =
γ
1− γ
µ
ax
γ
+ d
¶1−γ
where
ax
γ
+ d ≥ 0. (9)
The Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion ρ(x) for this class of utility func-
tions equals aγ/(ax+ dγ). It is easy to see that linear utility prevails when-
ever γ = 0. Given HARA utility, the composite function g(·) takes the form
g(x) = m1/(1−γ)(x− n) + (m1/(1−γ) − 1)γd/a.
Defining the modified discount factors eb = eβ1/(1−?γ) and b = β1/(1−γ), the
shift parameters ek = eγ ed/ea and k = γd/a and applying g(·) where needed in
equation (8), we obtain a straightforward generalization of (5): 2
q[1]t = b(1−eb)[1 + ek] + (b− 1)k + (beb)q[1]t+2h. (10)
Proposition 1 When utility functions are in the HARA class, the Rubin-
stein alternating oﬀers game with discounting has a unique SPE. As the
interval between oﬀers goes to zero, the payoﬀ received by player 2 (with
discount factor β) is given by
q =
eδ0(1 + ek)− δ0k
δ0 + eδ0 (11)
where δ0 = δ/(1− γ) and eδ0 = eδ/(1− eγ).
2For a player displaying log utility (e.g., eγ = 1, for player 1), we replace the corre-
sponding modified discount factor with eb = exp(eβ) ∈ (1, e).
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Proof. To obtain (11), take the limit of the expression
qS(h) =
b(1−eb)³1 + ek´+ (b− 1)k
1− beb
as h→ 0 and apply L’Hospital’s rule.
Note that there is a discontinuity in the ’modified discount factors’ eδ0 and
δ0 at γ = 1. As they become negative for γ > 1, this cases formally fall
outside the framework of Rubinstein (1982). 3 Throughout, we therefore
focus on the cases where γ ∈ [0, 1].
The properties of (11) are intuitive. First, the solution reduces to (2) when
preferences are linear (i.e. eγ = γ = 0). Second, symmetry of preferences
produces a 50/50 split. Third, when both players display constant relative
risk aversion (i.e. when ek = k = 0) we have q = eδ0/(δ0 + eδ0) and the risk
tolerance of the players aﬀects the solution only if it diﬀers across players;
otherwise the solution for the linear case continues to hold even when the
players are both risk averse. Since γ corresponds to the relative risk aversion
in the iso-elastic case, the game leads to well behaved solutions only as long
as relative risk aversions stay below unity.
3Rubinstein required that the side payment needed to compensate a player for delay be
an increasing function of the payment being delayed. Thus w would have to be increasing
in x in u(x) = βu(x+ w) . But for HARA w(x) = [(1− b)/b](x+ k), which is decreasing
in x for b˙ > 1. With CRRA only cases in which risk aversion is below unity respect
Rubinstein’s regularity condition.
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4 Eﬀects of risk aversion on payoﬀs
Equation (11) allows us to study the impact of risk aversion on a player’s
payoﬀ. Moreover, it allows us to conclude that Roth’s 1985 theorem tying
greater risk neutrality to a smaller bargaining share does not hold generally.
To see this, consider the case in which player 2 has a utility function that
displays decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) while player 1 is risk neu-
tral. This configuration pitching a risk averse player against a risk neutral
is of considerable practical interest, with potential applications to insurance,
credit, land tenure, and employment relationships, to mention just a few.
Let a = 1, d = −1 so that we have
eu(x) = eax and u(x) = γ
1− γ
µ
x
γ
− 1
¶1−γ
.
It is easy to verify that the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion ρ(x) for
player 2 is strictly increasing in the preference parameter γ ∈ [0, 1]. Note
that, in this case, the restriction in (9), that guarantees that the DARA utility
function is well defined becomes x ≥ γ. To ensure that utility is defined for
all feasible bargains q ∈ [0, 1], assume that players receive endowments at
the rate eω and ω per period. The endowments assure that the problem is
well specified for all γ ≤ hω. With the above specification the diﬀerence
equations (3) and (4) simplify to
q[1]t = (hω − γ)(b− 1) + bq
[2]
t+h, (12)
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Figure 1: Linear vs. DARA
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and
q[2]t+h = (1 + heω)(1−eb) +ebq[1]t+2h. (13)
Substituting (13) into (12) then establishes
qS(h) =
b(1−eb)(1 + heω) + (b− 1)(hω − γ)
1− beb (14)
as the unique solution to the bargaining game.
As an example, consider the case where eω = 0 and both players discount
the future at the same rate, i.e. eδ = δ. We set ω = 0.95, h = 1, and δ = 0.01,
with the parameter γ varying between 0 and hω. The Figure shows how the
payoﬀ of player 2 is aﬀected by increases in γ. Starting from a payoﬀ of 0.02,
when γ and the (endogenous) risk aversion are zero, the payoﬀ of player 2
gradually increases as γ and risk aversion grow.
The example above makes it clear that Roth’s theorem linking greater
risk aversion to lower payoﬀs is not general, and does not hold in the case of
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DARA utility functions. In the Appendix we explain why his theorem only
holds when the parameter d is equal to zero.
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Appendix
In his proof Roth relied on a normalization of the utility function to force
it through u(0) = 0 . He then defined an increase in risk aversion as an
increasing and concave transformation of the utility function. For utility
functions belonging to the HARA class, we can generate such a transfor-
mation by replacing γ ∈ [0, 1] by bγ > γ, where bγ is also between zero and
one. When the utility function is given by equation (9), the transformation
bu(x) = g[u(x)] satisfies
g(z) =
bγ?γ
1− bγ [f(z) + (bγ − γ)d]1−?γ ≥ 0,
where f(z) = [((1− γ)/γγ)z]1/(1−γ) ≥ 0. It is straightforward to verify that
g is an increasing function whenever d ≥ 0 or else, whenever bγ is suﬃciently
small:
g0(z) =
bγ?γ
1− γ [f(z) + (bγ − γ)d]−?γ [f(z)]γ > 0.
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Furthermore, since bγ > γ, a suﬃcient condition for g to be concave is d ≤ 0:
g00(z) =
bγ?γ
γγ(1− γ)f(z)
2γ−1 [f(z) + (bγ − γ)d]−?γ−1 (f(z)− γd)(γ − bγ).
If d = 0, the transformation preserves g(0) = 0, as Roth assumed in his proof
(p. 209). This normalization is not feasible, however, when d diﬀers from
zero, because in this case the transformation also involves a shift along the
horizontal axis that is proportional to (bγ − γ)d. Within the HARA class,
therefore, Roth’s proof is less general than it appears. Our counterexample
shows that his normalization assumption is not without loss of generality.
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